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Hegel’s Science of Logic is notorious, especially among Aristotelians, for its 
awkward identity claims, such as “being and nothing are the same,” “freedom is 
the truth of necessity,” or “the particular is the universal.” From a formal point of 
view, one might urge a careful distinction between identification (“being is 
numerically identical with nothingness”), classification (“being is a species of 
nothingness”), and predication (“being has the quality of being nothing”). 
However, as it turns out, Hegel’s very conception of what it is to be a concept goes 
against such a rigid separation. The Hegelian Concept1 can be characterized by 
the three moments of being a general quality (the universal) as well as the species 
of a genus (the particular) as well as an individual (the singular). Each and every 
moment of the Concept is both the whole and one of its aspects. It is thanks to 
this kind of internal differentiation that the Concept can unite with itself in the 
form of a syllogism (sich mit sich zusammenschliefien). When stating that 
“everything rational is a syllogism” (90; 588),2 Hegel above all tells us something 
about the speculative Concept.
No matter whether what has been said so far is intelligible or not, it should be 
clear from the outset that Hegel’s conception of concepts and syllogisms is 
worlds apart from classical syllogistic. To start with, Hegel’s view of deductive 
reasoning is not limited to the consideration of merely extensional relations. 
Whereas ordinary syllogisms are founded on quantified judgments, expressing 
relations of inclusion between sets or classes (“all As are B,” “some Cs are D”), 
Hegel seems to nominalize quantifiers, so as to make “the universal,” “the 
particular” and “the singular” the three terms of syllogism. Furthermore, he is 
not much concerned with the formal principles of reasoning, as opposed to their 
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application in various fields of inquiry. Hegel’s Logic rather deals with the 
semantic aspects of inference. Universality, particularity and singularity are 
interpreted not only as indicating different ranges, but as standing for various 
ways of conceiving the functioning of concepts. This peculiar methodology is 
meant to allow for achieving philosophical insight about concepts and their 
relation to reality in an a priori fashion.3
Notwithstanding these dissimilarities, if Hegel’s doctrine of syllogism is 
assessed by its outer appearance, it presents itself as an odd mixture of traditional 
formal logic with specifically Kantian architectonic devices. Hegel’s treatment of 
syllogistic figures and induction, for instance, is reminiscent of the former. To 
the latter the chapter on syllogism owes its structure, which partially follows 
Kant’s table of judgments and categories. As depicted in Figure 10.1, Hegel 
distinguishes between several genera of inferences, namely qualitative syllogism 
or syllogism of existence, syllogism of reflection, and syllogism of necessity. 
These genera correspond to Kant’s titles of quality, relation and modality. As each 
Kantian class contains three categories, every genus of syllogism in Hegel’s Logic 
comprises three species. The first set encompasses the three figures known from 
Aristotelian syllogistic, whereas the second and third sets include other types of 
inferences, like induction, analogy, hypothetical and disjunctive syllogism.
Figure 10.1
A.
The syllogism of existence
a. First figure of the syllogism
b. The second figure
c. The third figure
B.
The syllogism of reflection
a. The syllogism of allness
b. The syllogism of induction
c. The syllogism of analogy
c.
The syllogism of necessity
a. The categorical syllogism
b. The hypothetical syllogism
c. The disjunctive syllogism
Hegel undertakes the discussion of all those forms of reasoning in order to offer 
an elaborate doctrine of conceptual thinking. Yet, he does not confine himself to 
dealing with abstract formulas or merely subjective operations. Instead, he 
considers the question of how the constitutive structures of reason are 
instantiated in reality. This is why the “Doctrine of the Concept” that makes up 
the second part of Hegel’s Science of Logic, besides covering the traditional 
themes of formal logic such as judgment and syllogism, encloses chapters on 
topics like mechanism, chemism, teleology, life, the true and the good. What 
connects them among each other and with the issue of inferential reasoning is 
Hegel’s conviction that conceptual relations as such are real. By an argument 
founded on the nature of syllogism and associated with the ontological proof for 
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the existence of God, Hegel maintains to establish the objectivity of the Concept. 
If the transition is sound, the argument leads to the twofold conclusion that, on 
the one hand, objectivity is to a certain extent conceptually structured and on 
the other hand, the Concept itself is a specific kind of object.
In what follows, I will initially give an overview of the three genera and nine 
species of syllogism distinguished by Hegel. The first genus comprises the 
Aristotelian figures of syllogism which, according to Hegel, form a circle of 
mutually justifying inferences (1). The second and third genera serve to disclose 
the ontological implications of inference. At this stage of the argument, it 
becomes indispensable to differentiate between concepts representing properties, 
concepts representing classes of things, and concepts representing metaphysical 
kinds. While the Hegelian Concept is conceived of as being all the three of them, 
its main feature is that of a really existing, objective universal (2). The paradigmatic 
case of an objective universal which can be described in syllogistic terms, is the 
solar system. A careful reading of the respective texts demonstrates that Hegel’s 
doctrine of syllogism is essentially concerned with the different perspectives 
from which a complex whole may be considered. Each aspect is made explicit by 
a syllogism, the terms of which stand for the various moments of the systematic 
whole. The single syllogisms combine into a circle by the permutation of their 
middle terms (3). In the Encyclopedia, several triads of syllogisms are used for 
explaining the organization of objective universals, such as the state, or 
philosophy itself. For Hegel, syllogistic reasoning after all is concomitant with 
proving our conception of something to be rational (4).
1. The circle of the three syllogistic figures
Hegel starts his discussion by declaring that “the syllogism in its immediate form 
has for its moments the determinations of the concept as immediate” (92; 590). 
This statement requires clarification. With the moments of the syllogism Hegel 
does not mean its premises and conclusion, but its three terms. These terms are 
identified as the determinations of the concept (i.e. the universal (U), the 
particular (P), and the singular (S)). Such an interpretation of the syllogism 
seems to suggest an extensional reading, taking the determinations to be 
quantifiers. It is worth noting, though, that these quantifiers are not the traditional 
“all,” “no,” “some” and “some not.” On the one hand, Hegel does not mention 
negative premises, so as to exclude two thirds of the 24 Aristotelian moods. 
On the other hand, the third moment of the Hegelian syllogism, appears to 
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be a singular term, whereas Aristotle’s syllogisms contain exclusively general 
terms.
If we replace, for example, the determination of universality with “mortals,” 
particularity with “humans” and singularity with “Gaius,” we will obtain the 
following inference: “All humans are mortal. Gaius is a human. Therefore Gaius 
is mortal.” Notwithstanding Hegels moan about the boredom by which one is 
seized when hearing the spiel (95; 593), the three judgments make up a correct 
syllogism. The subject and predicate of the conclusion, which constitute the 
extremes of the syllogism, are mediated by a third term which functions as 
subject in the major and as predicate in the minor premise. Quoting just the 
three terms, we obtain “Gaius—human—mortal,” or schematically “S—P—U,” 
Hegel’s formula for the first figure syllogism.4
One might still wonder about the exact meaning of Hegel’s schema. In 
classical formal logic the variables stand for any concept. If the propositions “all 
As are B” and “all Bs are C” are true of a triple of concepts, then so will be “all As 
are C.” The same relations can be expressed set theoretically by saying that set A 
is included in set B which in turn is included in set C. Consequently, it may be 
claimed that C is “the universal” in proportion to A and to B. But what applies to 
a syllogism of the form Barbara, obviously does neither hold for Celarent nor for 
Darii. If “all Ds are E,” and “no E is F,” then F cannot be considered “the universal” 
with respect to D and to E. Likewise, if “some Gs are H,” and “all Hs are J,” then G 
may or may not be more “universal” than H and J.5
Even less evident is the way in which Hegel uses the other two determinations 
of the concept. In the syllogism Barbara, B is “the particular” in proportion to C, 
but A is also “the particular” in proportion to B and to C. Furthermore, according 
to Hegel’s schema, A has to be “the singular,” which rules out all minor premises 
as well as conclusions with a plural subject. Only by strictly limiting the 
discussion to modus Barbara and to syllogisms with a singular premise, like in 
the example cited above, it seems plausible to identify the three terms with the 
determinations of universality, particularity, and singularity.
Hegel describes the function of a syllogism fundamentally as mediating 
between two concepts, namely between the subject and the predicate of a 
judgment. The judgment demands for mediation in the sense that it lacks 
justification. The middle term of the syllogism founds its conclusion. If Gaius is 
actually mortal, then this is because he is human. Hence the syllogism is not so 
much a series of three propositions, as a judgment supplemented by its conceptual 
foundation. In Hegel’s schema, the middle term—figuratively speaking—replaces 
the copula. Subject and predicate of the conclusion are linked in virtue of an 
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additional concept. In Hegel’s words: “Singularity connects [schliefit sich 
zusammen]6 with universality through particularity” (93; 590). In the Encyclopedia 
Logic, Hegel specifies that “a subject as individual is joined together 
[zusammengeschlossen], through a quality, with some universal determinacy” 
(§ 183; 256). By asserting that Gaius is mortal, the singular subject Gaius is 
connected with the universal determination of mortality by means of the feature 
of being human. Gaius’ mortality is thus justified by its humanity insofar as all 
humans are mortal (first premise) and Gaius is a human (second premise).
The nexus between conceptual mediation and justification is already present in 
Hegel’s lessons of philosophical propaedeutic taught at the Gymnasium in 
Nuremberg, where he states that the syllogism “contains, as such, the judgment 
with its ground.”7 The grounding function of the middle term has been a widely 
accepted idea for a long time and indeed goes back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.3 
In the Enlightenment philosopher Ernst Platner’s Aphorisms, used by Fichte as a 
textbook for his Jena lectures, the syllogism is defined as “a judgment with an 
added reason.” The reason is “that by which it is understood why the—affirmative 
or negative—predicate belongs to the subject.”9 Similarly, for Hegel, the difference 
between a mere judgment and the conclusion of an inference lies in the foundation 
on which the latter “as the mediated connection” (94; 592) is grounded.
While the conclusion of a syllogism is justified by its premises, the premises as 
such are immediate judgments and in need of further justification. Although the 
inference is necessary, the conclusion of a qualitative syllogism is only hypothetically 
true: If all humans are mortal, and if Gaius is a human, then Gaius is mortal. However, 
even if not all humans were mortal, the inference as such would still remain valid, 
without Gaius being necessarily mortal. For this reason scientific explanation is 
usually an open-ended process. Since a conclusion is no better than its premises, the 
search for justification continues with the mediation of uncertain premises.
For traditional formal logic all this does not constitute a major issue, because 
logical inquiry is limited to the study of the abstract rules of reasoning. The 
empirical sciences, on the other hand, look for experiential evidence on which to 
base their knowledge claims. Hegelian speculative reason on its part cannot 
settle for the former and is barred from the latter. The Science of Logic strives 
to provide new insights by developing pure thought-determinations, one of 
which is syllogism as the form of conceptual mediation. Hegel consequently is 
wondering how complete mediation is possible in pure thinking. As we have 
seen so far, in the syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion is based on two 
unfounded premises. In order to mediate also these premises, two additional 
inferences would be needed, one to found the first premise, the other to found 
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the second premise. But this move obviously cannot improve the situation. On 
the contrary, now there are four premises that lack justification instead of 
previously two. Schematically the problem may be depicted as shown below in 
Figure 10.2. The attempt of complete mediation appears to lead to an infinite 
progression of proofs.
Figure 10.2
To avoid such a progress to infinity, Hegel introduces yet another way of 
mediating the premises, namely by means of the respective third term. The 
premise S—P is thus justified by the universal U, the premise P—U is justified by 
the singular S. In this way the second and third figures of the syllogism are 
derived from the first as presuppositions of its premises. The second figure 
(P—S—U) combines the three determinations of the concept in a different order 
from the first, in that the subject of the conclusion of the latter has become the 
middle term of the former. The third figure (S—U—P) represents still another 
combination of the same three moments, with the remaining determination at 
the center. Hence the premises of each species of syllogism are founded on the 
other two inferences, while the three figures as a whole are based on the 
permutation of terms as illustrated in Figure 10.3. The process of mediation thus 
results in a “circle of reciprocal presupposing” (105; 603) formed by the three 
types of qualitative syllogism.10
From a methodological stance, the replacement of an infinite progress with a 
circle does not make a big difference, because either argument seems aporetic. 
According to Hegel, however, another consequence can be drawn which has 
both a negative and a positive side. On the negative side, Hegel polemicizes 
against the formalism of syllogistic reasoning. He rightly observes that syllogisms 
of the second and third figures do not lead to much insight into their subject 
matter. Since they rest on either negative or particular judgments as premises, 
their conclusions are of limited range.11 As long as the form of syllogism is 
understood in an abstract way, “only totally empty results are produced” (108; 
607). Alluding to Kant’s essay on The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures 
and chastising the standard textbook accounts of logic, Hegel remarks that one
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Figure 10.3
should not be surprised if the Aristotelian figures “have later been treated as an 
empty formalism” (§ 187; 259).
Nevertheless, the statement of formalism is only one side of the coin. The 
other side is “the positive result, namely that mediation occurs, not through any 
single qualitative determinateness of form, but through the concrete identity of 
the determinacies” (106; 604). Complete mediation can only be achieved if all 
three moments of the concept function one by one as middle term. The circle of 
the three syllogistic figures for Hegel has a profound sense which “rests upon the 
necessity that each moment as a determination of the concept becomes itself the 
whole and the mediating ground” (§ 187; 259).
2. Ontological implications of inference
At first glance, Hegel’s development of the syllogism of existence is a failure. 
Although by connecting the three figures he obtains complete mediation of all 
premises, the result appears to be an empty formalism. This state of affairs makes 
it difficult even to imagine how the transition to further types of inference will 
be brought about. After exhausting the method of permutation, another sort of 
consideration is needed. As in all chapters in the Science of Logic, Hegel presents 
the development of different forms as a dialectical movement in the course of 
which categories are determined step by step. His method, in a nutshell, consists 
of introducing new categories or forms that express the conceptual content more 
adequately than their respective predecessors.12 This procedure leads to a 
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semantic enrichment, as can be easily seen from the structure of the book. 
Categories such as “judgment,” “mechanism” or “life” (Doctrine of the Concept) 
are more complex than “ground” or “appearance” (Doctrine of Essence), which in 
turn are richer than “existence” or “quantity” (Doctrine of Being).
Regarding qualitative syllogism, Hegel initially takes the three figures to be a 
mere aggregate of distinct forms. As long as no further specification is supplied, 
there is just a set of syllogisms, each with a different middle term. Syllogism as a 
genus can be characterized by enumerating the various figures, though without 
pretending completeness of the list. From there the transition to still another 
form of inference is motivated by the concern that if the true nature of syllogism 
amounts to nothing more than being a set of inferential forms, then it will be 
represented best in terms of inductive reasoning. To claim something about the 
syllogism in general means first to indicate the three figures with the 
determinations of universality (U), particularity (P), and singularity (S) as 
middle terms, and second to highlight their common trait of being a mediated 
connection of concepts. Hegel thus describes induction as “the syllogism of 
experience—of the subjective gathering together of singulars in the genus, and 
of the conjoining of the genus with a universal determinateness on the ground 
that the latter is found in all singulars” (114; 612 f.).
While it may seem obvious that an empirical conception of inference is not 
applicable to formal reasoning nor to speculative logic, Hegel calls into question 
even its everyday use and scientific worth. Indeed, a contingent list of premises 
cannot be guaranteed to be complete, nor can the occurrence of counterinstances 
be excluded for certain. The fact that all the many swans observed so far have 
been white, neither implies that no other swans exist, nor does it mean that you 
will never find a black swan. But if the syllogism of induction, Hegel continues 
to wonder, just gathers the singular instances in a class, it remains unclear what 
makes them members of the same genus. This doubt ushers in the next form of 
inference, namely the syllogism of analogy.
Hegel’s example of a syllogism of analogy is the erroneous reasoning: “The 
earth has inhabitants. The moon is an earth. Therefore the moon has inhabitants” 
(115; 614).13 To underscore the superficiality of the analogy, Hegel argues that 
inferring something’s having inhabitants from its being an earth calls for 
clarification of the nature of the middle term. If the syllogism is supposed to 
work, the concept “earth” cannot simply refer to something concrete, but must be 
taken likewise as a “universal nature” (117; 615). Only if having inhabitants 
constitutes an essential attribute of a heavenly body’s being an earth, the analogy 
yields its conclusion. In this case, however, we are already beyond the stage of 
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induction and analogy or, as Hegel calls it, the syllogism of reflection. The validity 
of the conclusion no longer depends on the singular items, nor on the similarities 
existing between them, but on their essence or nature.
The standard example of the categorical syllogism quoted above has the 
advantage of being grounded precisely in a middle term that expresses “the 
objective universal, the genus” (117; 616). The word “human” is used both as an 
adjective and as a noun. In the first case the term seems to signify a universal 
property, in the second case it denotes a singular subject or substance. The two 
are made possible by the fact that humanity as a natural kind possesses a certain 
set of attributes which necessarily belong to every individual of the genus. Gaius 
is mortal not just because he has the feature of being human, nor because all 
humans happen to be mortal, but because mortality is an essential note of 
humanity. What I have called a semantic enrichment thus reveals itself to be an 
ontological commitment. Inferential reasoning as such requires an essentialist 
perspective on the middle term. If the syllogism is founded either on abstract 
qualities or on sets of things, no conceptual insights will be obtained so that our 
knowledge remains strictly limited to the realm of empirical facts.
In the chapter on syllogism Hegel makes a clear case for an essentialist conception 
of concepts. A true concept expresses the nature of the things falling under it in that 
they necessarily instantiate the essential attributes comprehended in the concept. 
Without a similar ontological commitment it would be impossible to gain knowledge 
through concepts. A similar reading of the syllogism chapter finds further 
confirmation in the fact that Hegels list of syllogisms otherwise would contain three 
identical items. The first figure of the qualitative syllogism, the syllogism of allness, 
and the categorical syllogism all actually have the same form. If there were no 
semantic differences, they would also agree in content. But even though Hegel’s 
system of syllogisms shows obvious reminiscences to Kant’s tables of judgments and 
categories, its order should not be simply dismissed as artificial. The distinction 
between three classes, corresponding to Kant’s titles, rather points to various ways of 
interpreting the middle term. In the syllogism of existence, mediation is thought to 
be realized by a particular quality, in the syllogism of reflection by a set of singular 
things, in the syllogism of necessity by the universality of genus.
As it turns out, only the last interpretation of the middle term actually 
makes it possible to acquire inferential knowledge. Only if the conclusion is 
grounded not on observation, or any other empirical evidence, but on a genus 
concept, singular objects can be said to necessarily possess certain attributes. 
This means that only the third of the aforementioned species of syllogism is 
more than a blank formalism, because its middle term bears conceptual content.
200 The Aftermath of Syllogism
Hegel’s argument in the Science of Logic doctrine of syllogism thus boils 
down to establishing the categorical syllogism as the true form of inferential 
reasoning.
There are, however, two shortcomings in this reconstruction. The first is that 
two other forms of inference still follow, namely hypothetical and disjunctive 
syllogism. The second difficulty is that so far we have been talking about ordinary 
concepts (e.g. the concept of humanity), whereas Hegel is concerned with the 
concept of the Concept. His “Doctrine of the Concept” is not so much an 
investigation of whether and why “humanity” warrants Gaius’ mortality, as a 
study on the determinations of the speculative Concept and their interrelations. 
Hegel’s overall aim is to prove that the three moments of universality, particularity, 
and singularity constitute an objective whole, or genus.
The remaining two forms of syllogism serve the purpose to make explicit 
what kind of concept is presupposed by the categorical syllogism. Hegel, more 
specifically, intends to establish the real nature of the middle term. The final step 
of his argument, which comprises the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogism, 
reveals the genus or objective universality as something existing. Hegel’s 
consideration is roughly the following: If the genus concept is to ground the 
conclusion, there has to be a necessary relation between a singular object’s being 
a member of the genus (Gaius’ being human) and its possession of certain 
essential properties (Gaius’ being mortal). This relation, as Hegel sees it, is 
expressed by a syllogism of the form: “If A is, so is B. But A is. Therefore B is” 
(121; 620).
This move is rather bewildering, since the hypothetical in contrast to the 
categorical syllogism comprises only two terms which are so to speak extremes 
without a middle.14 Moreover, the premises in the formula above are existential 
instead of predicative judgments. As Hegel sees it, the hypothetical syllogism 
adds the “immediacy of being” (ibid.). These irregularities notwithstanding one 
may still see the hypothetical syllogism as expressing exactly the function 
fulfilled by the middle term of the categorical syllogism. The latter provides 
conceptual knowledge on the condition that every specimen of the genus 
possesses a certain essential quality. In other words: whenever there is an instance 
of A (for example, being human), there is also an instance of B (being mortal). 
The expression “an instance of” disguises the difference between the classification 
in a genus and the predication of an attribute. Although this may seem formally 
incorrect, it does not cause any trouble, as long as the Hegelian Concept is 
thought of as something which is universal in the sense of both genus and 
attribute. The hypothetical syllogism then does not change the perspective of the 
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preceding passages, namely to make explicit the necessity to interpret the middle 
term of the categorical syllogism as objective universality.
This line of argument is completed in the section dedicated to the disjunctive 
syllogism. Whereas Hegel’s hypothetical syllogism tallies with the traditional 
modus ponens, his disjunctive syllogism is equivalent to modus tollendo ponens, 
obeying to the following rule: “A is either B or C or D. But A is B. Therefore A 
is neither C nor D” (124; 622). By the subject term A Hegel now means the 
objective universal.15 The predicates B, C, D can be seen as species which form 
the genus A. This explains why As being B necessarily implies it not being C nor 
D. It is characteristic for objective universality to realize itself in several forms 
which constitute a whole by reciprocally excluding each other. This analysis 
explains the apparent oddity that the formula for Hegel’s disjunctive syllogism 
consists of four instead of three terms. The discrepancy is unavoidable 
whenever various subsets are said to belong to the same class. By claiming, for 
instance, that all cycles are either pedal-powered or motor-powered, one uses 
three terms for defining two different species of two-wheelers. The same 
applies for the “mediating means” (Vermittelnde) in the Hegelian syllogism: it 
is “the universal sphere of its particularizations” and at the same time “is 
determined as a singular” (124; 623). Thereby it should be clear that the“middle” 
(Mitte') here does not denote an alleged central term of the disjunctive syllogism 
but rather that concept which could serve as mediator in the categorical 
syllogism, and the constitution of which is made explicit by the disjunctive 
syllogism.
From the perspective of speculative logic, the term A thus has to be regarded 
as the Concept, with B, C and D representing the three moments of universality, 
particularity and singularity. The main feature of the Concept as objective 
universal is its being both particularized and determined as a singular. The 
singularity, for Hegel, is instantiated through the negative relation holding 
between each moment and the others. Since the disjunctive syllogism is 
emblematic for “the unity of the mediator and the mediated” (124; 623), Hegel 
finally declares that “the form of the syllogism, which consisted in the difference 
of the middle term over against its extremes, has thereby sublated itself” (125; 
624). As a result of the “sublation of the mediation” (126; 624), the conceptual 
scheme of formal logic—judgment and syllogism—does not any longer suffice 
for expressing the true nature of the Concept. Hegel introduces the category of 
“objectivity” for further determining pure thought. He labels this step the 
“realization of the concept,” comparing it with Anselm’s as well as Descartes’ 
ontological argument for the existence of God (§ 193; 265-268). Like the idea of 
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the most perfect being implies its existence, the concept of the Concept suggests 
a really existing, objective universal.
3. The paradigmatic case of the solar system
The syllogism chapter aims at establishing the Concept as something objective, 
to wit really existing. In the subsequent section of the Science of Logic, Hegel 
explains the specific “objectivity” of the Concept with the help of the categories 
of mechanism, chemism, and teleology. The corresponding chapters always 
struck readers as odd because of the difficulty of avoiding the impression that 
after dealing with mental activities such as judging and reasoning, the author 
now passes to the treatment of physical objects in space and time. In such a 
case, Hegel would have to be blamed for merging the sphere of pure logical 
thinking with the realm of nature. It is worthy of note, though, that a similar 
objection could already be leveled against interpreting logical subjectivity as 
something mental, thus assigning judgment and syllogism to the philosophy 
of mind. Hegel clearly refused both interpretations. Subjectivity as well as 
objectivity are determinations of the Concept as such and do not refer directly 
either to mind or to nature. The neutral stance becomes evident when Hegel 
describes mechanism, chemism, and teleology themselves as syllogisms. For the 
sake of brevity I will engage only with “absolute mechanism” which is arguably 
the most elaborate case of syllogistic reasoning in Hegel’s Logic.
Hegel distinguishes several types of logical mechanism depending on which 
kind of forces are thought to act on a body. The simplest case of moving force is 
pressure or impact, as exemplified by one billiard ball colliding with another. 
Such a mechanism is far from being absolute because the pushing body usually 
receives its drive from a third one, and so forth. Whether a ball hits the next 
mainly depends on the forces which act on them. The mechanical process of 
action and reaction is triggered by external factors which leave the object as such 
intact. After rejecting its depiction in terms of matter and form, or as a thing 
with properties, Hegel deploys the moments of universality, particularity, and 
singularity for further clarification. When one body interacts with another, 
communicating kinetic energy to it, “their identical universality is posited.” This 
universal form yet does not sublate the particularity of each object. On the 
contrary, the universality “particularizes itself only in their diversity,” in that one 
body is acting, the other is reacting. What occurs here is “a reciprocal repulsion 
of the impulse.” By repelling the impact, the mechanical object for Hegel 
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demonstrates its self-subsistence. When mechanically speaking action “passes 
over into rest,” logically speaking the particular object “returns to singularity” 
(138 f.; 636 f.).
In summarizing the process delineated so far, Hegel puts his considerations in 
syllogistic form: “Immediately, the object is presupposed as a singular; then as a 
particular as against another particular; but finally as indifferent towards its 
particularity, as universal. The product is the totality of the concept previously 
presupposed but now posited. It is the conclusion [Schlufisatz] in which the 
communicated universal is united [zusammengeschlossen] with singularity 
through the particularity of the object” (139; 637). One and the same physical 
body hence combines in itself all three moments constitutive of the concept. 
Abstractly considered, it is just a singular thing; seen in connection with another 
body acting on it, the object becomes something particular; from the perspective 
of the equality of action and reaction, it is universally determined. Finally Hegel 
associates the product of the mechanical process with the logical scheme S-P-U 
of the syllogism. Even if the object is in rest, it receives its determination by the 
mediation of another body.
The foregoing statement of the unity of self-subsistence and mediation is 
merely formal. It applies indistinctively to any mechanical object. Physical bodies 
characteristically do not possess internal determinations but are only externally 
interrelated. In kinematics they are idealized as moving point masses. Hegel’s 
story, however, does not finish here. Despite their apparent independence, the 
manifold objects form a complex whole called absolute mechanism. The unity of 
the whole for Hegel is represented by the center (Zentrum) or central body 
(Zentralkorper) towards which all the other objects strive (142 f.; 640 f.). The 
mechanism is absolute in the sense that the various bodies are in motion without 
being driven by an external force, as can be seen by the examples of objects 
falling to the Earth, or planets circling around the Sun. Neither free fall nor 
orbital motion is communicated by impact or pressure. They depend on the 
relation between falling or gravitating bodies and the said center. Hegel designates 
the latter “the individualized universality of the single objects and their 
mechanical process”as well as“the real middle term [reale Mitte]”through which 
the objects are united (zusammengeschlossen) in and for themselves (143; 641).
Which then is the syllogism of which the center of absolute mechanism is the 
real middle? So far we have encountered only two terms, namely the single 
objects and the central body. Hegel yet introduces a further distinction between 
what, in celestial mechanics, are called planets and satellites respectively. A planet 
is an object both orbiting the central body and orbited on his part by other, 
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smaller bodies. “These second centers and the non-self-subsistent objects are 
brought into unity [zusammengeschlossen] by the absolute middle term” (144; 
642). The syllogistic structure of absolute mechanism may be exemplified, for 
instance, by the triad of Earth, Sun and Moon. The relation between Earth and 
Moon is intelligible on the basis of their common interaction with the Sun as the 
center of mass.
It should be added immediately that the absolute mechanism, in contrast to 
the mechanical process considered above, is not encompassed in one single 
syllogism but in a circle of the three syllogisms. As sketched in the preceding 
chapter, the remaining figures evolve through the permutation of the middle 
term. Thus, Hegel explains, “the relative individual centers themselves also 
constitute the middle term of a second syllogism. This middle term is, on the one 
hand, subsumed under a higher extreme, the objective universality and power of 
the absolute center; on the other hand, it subsumes under it the non-self­
subsistent objects.” To complete the series, the third term also has to function as 
mediating means. “These non-self-subsistent objects are in turn the middle term 
of a third syllogism, the formal syllogism, for since the central individuality 
obtains through them the externality by virtue of which, in referring to itself, it 
also strives towards an absolute middle point, those non-self-subsistent objects 
are the link between absolute and relative central individuality” (ibid.).16
Passing through the circle of the three syllogistic figures for Hegel is first and 
foremost a mark of systematicity and, as a result, rationality. Since inferential 
knowledge is specific to reason, being brought into the form of a syllogism is 
tantamount to being rational. Complying with reason on the other hand means 
absoluteness, or independence,or self-sufficiency (Selbstandigkeit'j.The planetary 
system is an absolute mechanism in that it is completely governed by the law 
of gravitation. No further inner qualities or external forces are needed for 
differentiating the objects or explaining the processes which make up the whole. 
While the development of Hegel’s speculative logic obviously has not yet reached 
its final stage, the category of mechanism already foreshadows the perfect unity 
between conceptual ideality and reality as well as between freedom and necessity. 
Hegel dubs the law of absolute mechanism paradoxically “free necessity” because 
“in the ideality of its difference it refers only to itself” (146; 644). Besides the 
blatant reference to Spinoza’s metaphysics, the formula indicates a process of 
gradual self-differentiation that generates complex determinations without 
external impact.
It is astonishing, to say the least, that the most extended application of 
inferential reasoning in Hegel’s system is found in the mechanism chapter of the 
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Science of Logic. One reason may be the proximity to the doctrine of syllogism. 
With the three figures and genera still fresh to the mind, both author and reader 
will more easily grasp the hidden conceptual structures which determine the 
logical categories as well as the corresponding reality. The case of the planetary 
system then is paradigmatic because in accordance with the three syllogisms just 
as many kinds of moving forces can be distinguished. The first and most abstract 
sort of relation is represented by pressure and impact. Mechanical objects formally 
considered are indifferent with respect to the forces exercised by or upon them. 
On a second level, however, there is an essential difference between a celestial 
body that attracts smaller objects, and these objects falling towards the central 
body. The center defines the force field in which the objects lacking self-sufficiency 
are located. In the third and final type of mechanism, attraction and fall are 
replaced by gravity. Hegel portrays the latter as the “objective universality” which 
“persists self-identical in the particularization” (145; 643). One and the same law 
of gravitation determines all of the particular objects forming the system.
The relation between several mechanical objects hence can be considered 
from a threefold perspective: as pressure and impact, as attraction and fall, or as 
gravitation. What makes the planetary system paradigmatic for inferential 
reasoning is the amalgamation of these three aspects, each correspondent to one 
of the syllogistic figures, with three types of celestial bodies, each correspondent 
to one of the terms. As we have already seen, apart from the absolute center 
(universality) and the non-self-subsistent objects (particularity), the absolute 
mechanism incorporates relative individual centers (singularity).17 Like the 
Earth that stands in the middle between the Moon and the Sun, the relative 
centers combine centrality, or self-sufficiency, with dependency. In sum, what 
makes up a system of syllogisms is the connect between a triad of terms with as 
many perspectives.
4. Other triads of syllogisms
Although the category of mechanism has its paradigmatic application in the 
solar system, its use is not restricted to the realm of physics, or nature in general. 
In the Science of Logic, Hegel in fact coins the term “spiritual mechanism” and 
describes it as consisting in “the things connected in the spirit remaining external 
to one another and to spirit” (133; 631). When somebody recites a poem in a 
monotonous voice, devoid of any emotion, she may be relying on mechanical 
memory which connects the words externally without attaching a sense to them.
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Or when devout people perform their prayers and fulfill their rituals in a 
detached and uninvolved manner, they could be said to act mechanically 
(cf. § 195 Remark; 270 f.). In both cases the spirit seems to operate without 
considering the meaning and implications of what is said or done. As the 
“pervasive presence that is proper to spirit” is lacking (133; 631), spiritual 
mechanism is contrary to self-conscious freedom.
Hegel’s talk of spiritual mechanism should not be taken in a reductionist 
sense, as if the human mind was reduced to a machine. Spirit certainly belongs 
to a higher domain of reality than the planetary system, and is far too complex 
to be explained in terms of mechanism. However, as always in Hegel’s system, 
with the advancing development of the Concept the earlier categories are not 
completely abandoned but sublated into the later ones. The concept of objectivity, 
for instance, takes up the previously explicated determinations of being, 
existence, actuality, and substantiality (cf. 130; 628). In a similar way, the idea of 
life supposes mechanical and chemical processes (cf. 189; 686). Likewise some 
operations of the human spirit can be described as mechanical, though spirit as 
such transcends mechanism. This is the reason why “in things spiritual the 
center, and the union with it, assume higher forms” (143; 641).
The clearest example is the analogy drawn by Hegel between the solar system 
and the state. “The government, the individual citizens, and the needs or the 
external life of these—Hegel declares—are also three terms, of which each is the 
middle term of the other two.” (144 f.; 642) As the list makes evident, the three 
terms cannot be simply identified with various things, entities, or substances. 
Since all elements of the planetary system are celestial bodies with different 
masses, one might have expected the moments of the state to be the citizens with 
their respective social roles, such as for instance the three estates (clergy, nobility, 
commoners) in the Ancien Regime, or the three branches of government 
(legislative, executive, and judicial). Hegel yet draws a more complex picture of 
the social organism.
The state is seen from different perspectives which are displayed by the triad 
of syllogisms. He briefly characterizes each of the three syllogisms, beginning 
with the moment of universality constituted by the government. It is “the absolute 
center in which the extreme of the singulars is united [zusammengeschlossen] 
with their external existence.” The middle term of the next syllogism is the 
individual citizens, who “incite that universal individual into external concrete 
existence and transpose their ethical essence into the extreme of actuality.” In the 
third and final syllogism “the singular citizens are tied by their needs and external 
existence to this universal absolute individuality” (145; 642).
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In a remark to the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel repeats the same considerations 
at greater length and in a slightly different order. Because of its pertinence to our 
topic, it is worth quoting the text in full before commenting on it:
(1) The individual (the person) joins itself through its particularity (physical and 
spiritual needs, what becomes the civil society, once they have been further 
developed for themselves) with the universal (the society,justice,law, government).
(2) The will, the activity of individuals, is the mediating factor which satisfies 
the needs in relation to society, the law, and so forth, just as it fulfils and realizes 
the society, the law, and so forth.
(3) But the universal (state, government, law) is the substantial middle [term] 
in which the individuals and their satisfaction have and acquire their fulfilled 
reality, mediation, and subsistence.
§ 198 Remark; 273
These three phrases arguably constitute Hegel’s most explicit statement of 
syllogistic reasoning in the practical sphere. He concludes the remark with the 
declaration that “it is only through the nature of this joining together, through 
this triad of syllogisms with the same terminis, that a whole is truly understood 
in its organization” (ibid.). The state is seen not so much as the union of its 
citizens which like atoms compose a molecule, or like members form a body. The 
individuals’ specific contribution to the understanding of the social whole rather 
consists in their being subjects of self-conscious will and activity.
The second stage of Hegel’s argument turns on the mediation between the 
particular interests and desires propelling people, on the one hand, and the 
universal norms governing social life, on the other. The adjustment between the 
two extremes depends on the citizens’ free self-determination. Pursuing both the 
satisfaction of their own needs and the actualization of common values, every 
singular person aims at reconciling particularity with universality. The mediating 
principle is the people’s willing and acting. The economic system as well as the 
socio-political institutions, for Hegel, are no impersonal processes or structures 
which escape human influence, but manifestations of our free will and activity.
Like the planetary system, the triad of syllogisms originates in the permutation 
of terms so that “the mediation joins each of the determinations with the other 
extreme” (ibid.). Again, like physical mechanism, the three syllogisms represent 
several types or levels of mediation. Hegel, in other words, distinguishes three 
ways of conceiving social unity, namely in the first place as determined by 
economic requirements; in a second moment as facilitating personal self­
fulfillment; or finally as directed towards the implementation of universal 
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norms.18 The first syllogism thus corresponds to the point of view of what Hegel 
calls the civil society, in which all individuals or singular families tend to achieve 
their respective physical and spiritual needs. The second syllogism stresses 
the volitional character of social organization and the active part citizens have 
to play in the construction of society. Without the third syllogism these 
considerations would ultimately amount to a liberalist conception of the state, 
with political institutions confined to a functional role either for the development 
of the economic sector or for the exercise of individual liberty.
Hegel then adds the aspect of universality as represented by the political 
institutions and the constitution of the state as a whole. Fundamental ethical 
norms in a society are to be preserved through legislation, governance, and 
judicature. The third type of mediation is as essential as the preceding ones. If 
the convictions of a people are not brought into a constitutional order, they will 
remain literally ineffective. The different aspects of the three syllogisms, though, 
reveal the true nature of the social organism only if taken together. A society that 
does not satisfy its members’ material needs, or disregards their freedom of 
choice, would be equally defective as a community that does not give itself a 
political constitution in accordance with common ethical norms.
Nevertheless, as Hegel sees it, the third syllogism performs the function of 
integrating the preceding moments into a complex whole exemplifying objective 
universality. In the realm of physics this results in the primacy of gravitation over 
impact and attraction, in the case of the state it leads to the supremacy of politics 
over economy. Hegel certainly subscribes to the claim that the common good 
takes precedence over private concerns, but the main issue here is that political 
institutions by their nature are meant to solve the tension between particular 
needs or singular wills, on the one hand, and a vision of the whole on the other 
hand. With Karl Popper in mind, it could be objected that the excesses of holism 
are still more harmful and dangerous than any kind of liberalism. In contrast, 
Hegel points out that, as the gravitational system is not just a set of bodies 
impacting one another, the constitution of the state is more than a mere 
mechanism of balancing interests. Without necessarily implying that political 
procedures should not be understood as a mechanism at all, Hegel deploys his 
syllogistic method to arrive at a more adequate conception of the state as a whole.
Notwithstanding the succeeding chapters are scattered with syllogistic 
vocabulary like “premise,” “middle term,” “inference,” or “conclusion,” Hegel 
admittedly offers no further elaboration of his method. In the Science of Logic, he 
explicitly talks of three syllogisms which constitute the totality of chemism (cf. 
152; 649).19 When dealing with teleology, he associates the means (MitteT) with 
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the middle term (Mitte) of a formal syllogism (cf. 163; 660), mentioning again 
three syllogisms (cf. 171; 669).20 In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel denotes the 
idea of life as “the syllogism, whose moments are systems and syllogisms in 
themselves.” By the moments he means the mechanical, chemical, and teleological 
processes which conjointly make up living, understood as “the process of its 
coming to closure together with itself [Zusammenschliefiens mit sich selbst]” 
(§ 217; 288). In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel characterizes his way of 
determining the notion of gravitation as the “syllogism of totality, which is in 
itself a system of three syllogisms.”21 A few paragraphs later, he remarks about 
the chemical process that its complete exposition would require “that it should 
be explicated as a triad of intimately interrelating syllogisms,” referring without 
much ado to the aforesaid section 198 of the Encyclopedia Logic.22 With regard to 
the animal organism, Hegel claims that it “passes syllogistically through its three 
determinations,” namely the formation of shape, the assimilation of stimuli and 
nutriment, and reproduction. Since the three processes concern one and the 
same animal, “each syllogism is implicitly the same totality of substantial unity, 
and [...] at the same time the transition into the others.”23
Even though the state in Hegel’s Logic is presented as a system of syllogistic 
inferences, neither his Philosophy of Right in general nor the section on the state 
in particular take up the alleged triad. To be sure, Hegel makes ample use of 
syllogistic discourse, but it is far from obvious which syllogisms, if any, form his 
system of right.24 In the Encyclopedia, it is not before the end of the section on 
absolute spirit that the pattern of interrelated syllogisms is again employed. After 
explaining the several moments of Christian religion, from God’s nature via the 
creation of the world and the incarnation of Christ to the effusion of the Holy 
Spirit, Hegel speaks of the revelation as “three syllogisms, which constitute the 
one syllogism of the absolute mediation of spirit with itself.”25 I have shown 
elsewhere that each syllogism stands for another aspect of religion, namely the 
history of salvation, the justification of man, and God’s essence as absolute 
spirit.26 Let me just repeat the crucial point that, according to Hegel, the three 
perspectives follow each other in ascending order. From a merely external 
representation of particular past events, religion proceeds to the conversion of 
the singular person culminating in the believers’ universal unity in God.
In Hegel’s system, religion is surmounted by philosophy as conceptual 
knowledge of the absolute which manifests itself in pure thought, in nature and 
in spirit. Not surprisingly, Hegel takes the triad of syllogisms to be the best 
pattern for explaining the unity of these moments. The concluding syllogisms 
of the system are meant to show that logic, nature and spirit constitute one 
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conceptually determined whole. In the last sections of the Encyclopedia, Hegel 
indicates the syllogisms, the first of which has “nature as the middle that joins 
[zusammenschlieflt] the spirit together with the logical” (§ 575), in the second 
syllogism spirit “is the mediator [Vermittelnde]” (§ 576), whereas the third “has 
self-knowing reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle [Mitte]” (§ 577).27 As 
in the other triads so far discussed, the permutation is not just a formalism but 
mirrors different senses of mediation. In the first instance the mediation has “the 
external form of transition,” the second syllogism relates to the standpoint of 
“subjective cognition,” whereas the third portrays philosophy as “self-knowing 
reason.”28 While the last syllogism includes the highest and speculatively true 
perspective, the others cannot be simply dispensed with. The permutation of 
terms rather exhibits the indissoluble unity of the three moments.29
This result is admittedly far away from inferences in the fashion of Aristotle’s 
modus Barbara. The Hegelian doctrine of syllogism is still centered on the 
middle term, but instead of being concerned with the conclusion as a proposition, 
the philosopher engages with the meaning of the three terms, emphasizing that 
their permutation leads to semantic enrichment. It is certainly in the latter sense 
that Hegel claimed that “everything rational is a syllogism” (90; 588). From a 
formal point of view, his method of syllogistic reasoning may appear 
unsatisfactory because he does not separate the logical form from material 
content. Furthermore it is not completely clear how Hegel himself arrives at the 
semantic determinations of his categories. Consequently, the Science of Logic is 
not an organon: it does not supply the reader with a toolkit of dialectical 
reasoning that could be schematically applied for deducing new concepts. For 
this reason, Hegel himself—in contrast to many of his followers and most of his 
critics—never considered the syllogistic presentation of his own system as 
concluded.
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